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Summary 
The federal cybersecurity workforce is responsible for protecting U.S. government systems and 
networks against cyber threats and attacks. Federal agencies, however, have reported difficulty in 
assessing the size and capabilities of their cybersecurity workforces. DOD and DHS, which play 
prominent roles in the nation’s cybersecurity posture, have also noted certain obstacles affecting 
the recruitment and retention of qualified cybersecurity professionals to fulfill their departments’ 
cybersecurity missions.  
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is constructing a dataset to catalog all federal 
cybersecurity positions in the executive branch. The dataset had not been released to Congress or 
the public. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to 
identify their top five cyber talent gaps by December 31, 2015. Congress has also authorized 
hiring and pay flexibilities that can be used to fill cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. The 
flexibilities aim to enhance the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity professionals by 
expediting the federal hiring process and providing such professionals with monetary incentives 
that are not available to all federal employees. OPM has also established temporary hiring 
flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions. 
Congress, pursuant to its oversight authority, might seek to increase its awareness and knowledge 
of these initiatives. OPM is not required to report to Congress on agencies’ progress in coding 
their federal cybersecurity positions or in completing the agency’s cybersecurity dataset. Further, 
DOD and DHS are not required to report on the use or effectiveness of certain hiring and pay 
flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. Congress may find it difficult to identify potential 
implementation issues, such as (1) conflicting efforts to define and identify the federal 
cybersecurity workforce, (2) discrepancies between the intended and actual use of hiring and pay 
flexibilities, and (3) measuring the overall effectiveness of the flexibilities. 
Congress could consider enhancing its oversight of executive branch initiatives to define and 
identify federal cybersecurity positions by (1) requiring OPM to notify Congress of its progress 
on completing the cybersecurity dataset, and (2) directing the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to evaluate the operation and effectiveness of the cybersecurity workforce dataset upon its 
completion. Congress could also enhance its oversight of the implementation of hiring and pay 
flexibilities for DOD and DHS by (1) conforming reporting requirements among the three laws 
governing hiring and pay flexibilities, (2) requiring additional reporting on the use of certain 
flexibilities, (3) directing DOD and DHS, or GAO, to evaluate the effectiveness of the hiring and 
pay flexibilities, and (4) requiring DOD and DHS human resources staff to receive training on the 
structure and operation of the flexibilities.  
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Introduction 
Cybersecurity refers to a broad set of concepts for which there is no standard definition—it often 
varies by the entity employing it. DHS, for example, has defined cybersecurity as “the activity or 
process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications systems and the 
information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized 
use or modification, or exploitation.”1 The Committee on National Security Systems has defined 
a “cyber attack” as  
An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of 
disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing 
environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled 
information.
 2
 
Strengthening federal cybersecurity has been a priority for Congress and the executive branch for 
several years.3 The focus on cybersecurity has increased since the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) data intrusion was revealed in June 2015, which heightened concerns about 
vulnerabilities within the government’s systems and networks.4  
All federal agencies have responsibilities for protecting their individual systems and networks 
under federal law.5 Some agencies, such as DHS and DOD, possess broader cybersecurity roles 
compared to other agencies. DHS has responsibility for protecting unclassified federal civilian 
systems and networks and assisting agencies in responding to cyber threats and attacks.6 DHS is 
also the lead agency for coordinating with the private sector to protect critical cyber infrastructure 
assets.7 DOD is responsible for defending the nation against cyberattacks of “significant 
consequence,” as well as conducting military operations in cyberspace.8 DOD is also responsible 
for assisting DHS in fulfilling its government-wide cybersecurity roles.9  
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (hereafter DHS) “Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity 
Terminology,” at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary. For more information on the definition of cybersecurity, see CRS 
Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, by Eric A. Fischer. 
2 Committee on National Security Systems, National Information Assurance Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009, 
April 26, 2010, p. 22, at http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/CNSSI-4009_National_Information_Assurance.pdf. 
3 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (hereafter GAO) added “security of federal cyber assets” to its high-risk 
list in 1997, and has since added protecting cyber critical infrastructure (2003) and the personally identifiable 
information (2015). See GAO, “High Risk List, Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber 
Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information,” February 2015, at 
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/protecting_the_federal_government_information_systems/why_did_study#t=0. 
4 For more information on the OPM data intrusion, see CRS Report R44111, Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management: In Brief, coordinated by Kristin Finklea. 
5 CRS has compiled a list of laws that govern the federal role in cybersecurity. See CRS Report R42114, Federal Laws 
Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview of Major Issues, Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation, by Eric A. Fischer. 
6 DHS, “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks,” October 2011, at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/preventing-and-defending-against-cyber-attacks-october-2011.pdf. 
7 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” February 12, 
2013, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-
cybersecurity; Executive Office of the President, “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience,” February 12, 2013, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.  
8 U.S. Department of Defense (hereafter DOD), National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, December 
2006, PDF p. 14, at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-023.pdf; DOD, The DOD Cyber 
Strategy, April 2015,  pp. 4-5 and 25, at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
(continued...) 
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The federal cybersecurity workforce plays an integral role in maintaining and improving the 
government’s cybersecurity. Cybersecurity professionals10 are responsible for designing and 
building secure information networks and systems, identifying and addressing vulnerabilities 
within those networks and systems, and collecting and analyzing data necessary to respond to 
cyber attacks efficiently and effectively, among other things. Federal stakeholders and researchers 
have stated that robust federal cybersecurity is not possible without cybersecurity professionals.11  
Developing and maintaining a robust federal cybersecurity workforce, however, has been an 
ongoing challenge. The Chief Human Capital Officers Council Working Group found skills gaps 
in cybersecurity positions (and other positions) government-wide, which prompted the Obama 
Administration to create a Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) to reduce those gaps by half by the end 
of FY2013.12 According to a January 2015 GAO report, however, efforts to close these 
cybersecurity gaps were at an “early stage of maturity.”13  
This report examines congressional oversight of two strategies undertaken by Congress and the 
executive branch to strengthen the federal cybersecurity workforce: (1) initiatives to define and 
identify the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) hiring and pay flexibilities applicable to 
cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. This report focuses on DOD and DHS because of their 
key roles in federal cybersecurity and because the majority of hiring and pay flexibilities for 
cybersecurity professionals authorized by Congress apply to DOD and DHS.    
Background on the Federal Cybersecurity 
Workforce 
Defining the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce 
Cybersecurity functions are embedded within a wide range of federal positions that span more 
than 100 federal occupational series (see the text box below for a definition of occupational 
series).14 The specific cybersecurity functions undertaken within an occupation series often vary 
by agency. For example, one DHS position in the 2210 occupation series that performs 
cybersecurity functions is responsible for identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses within IT 
                                                                
(...continued) 
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf. Examples of attacks of significant consequence 
include those that can result in the loss of life or serious economic impact to the United States.  
9 Ibid. For more information on DOD’s cybersecurity responsibilities, see CRS Report R43848, Cyber Operations in 
DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary. 
10 The terms “cybersecurity professional” and “cybersecurity employee” are used interchangeably in this report. 
11 See, for example, GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiative Need Better Planning and Coordination, 
November 2011, p. 3, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586494.pdf. 
12 GAO, “High Risk List, Strategic Human Capital Management,” at 
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/strategic_human_management/why_did_study#t=1; Executive Office of the President, 
“Cross-Agency Priority Goal, Closing Skills Gaps, FY2013 Q4 update,” pp. 1-2, at 
http://goals.performance.gov/content/closing-skills-gaps. The CAP goal included other mission-critical occupations 
identified as facing skills gaps, such as acquisition and economist positions.  
13 GAO, Federal Workforce, OPM and Agencies Need to Strengthen Efforts to Identify and Close Mission-Critical 
Skills Gaps, GAO-15-223,  January 2015, p. 15, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668202.pdf. 
14OPM, “A Strategic Perspective on the Federal Cybersecurity Work Function,” November 2014, p. 10, at 
https://www.fbcinc.com/e/nice/ncec/presentations/NICE2014_Antone.pdf. 
The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce: Background and Congressional Oversight Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
systems and developing procedures to defend against unauthorized access to the systems.15 A 
different DHS position in the 2210 occupation series that performs cybersecurity functions, in 
contrast, is responsible for evaluating and responding to cyber incidents.16 
OPM Occupational Series 
An occupation series includes groups of federal positions that perform similar work and require similar qualifications. 
For example, the Information Technology (IT) Management occupation series (2210) includes positions that “manage, 
supervise, lead, administer, develop, deliver, and support information technology systems and services” and require 
knowledge of IT principles, concepts, and methods.17 A 2011 GAO report on the federal cybersecurity workforce 
identified several occupational series that typically undertake cybersecurity responsibilities, including (but not limited 
to) information technology management, general engineering, and intelligence.18 
The full range of federal positions that undertake cybersecurity responsibilities is challenging to 
assess. Researchers have found that agencies have experienced difficulty in accurately defining 
and measuring their cybersecurity workforces.19 For example, a 2011 GAO report found wide 
disparities in counts of DOD cybersecurity employees—88,159 employees reported by GAO, 
compared to 18,955 reported by OPM. The GAO report partly attributed these inconsistent counts 
to the lack of a standard definition of a cybersecurity employee.20  
Challenges to Developing and Maintaining the Workforce 
Federal stakeholders and researchers have reported ongoing challenges to developing and 
maintaining a robust federal cybersecurity workforce. Commonly reported challenges are listed 
below and include government-wide and agency-specific concerns: 
 demand outstripping supply for cybersecurity professionals in the federal 
government and difficulty filling vacant cybersecurity positions;21 
 skills gaps in cybersecurity positions;22 and 
                                                 
15 The vacancy announcement for the position is closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/412242100.  
16The vacancy announcement for the position is closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/412534800. 
17 OPM, “Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families,” May 2009, pp. 120-121, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/occupationalhandbook.pdf. 
18 GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 
2011, p. 14. 
19 See, for example, ibid., pp. 12-13 and 15. 
20 Ibid., p. 13 and 15. The OPM count was conducted in 2010, whereas the GAO count was conducted in 2011. It is 
unclear if the OPM statistic included contractors. Research has indicated that contractors perform a notable proportion 
of cybersecurity work for agencies. For example, data from an OMB report indicated that approximately 33% of “IT 
Security” FTEs at agencies were contractors. For more information, see OMB, Report to Congress on Implementation 
of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, March 2013, p. 55, at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/fy12_fisma.pdf. 
21 RAND Corporation, “Shortage of Cybersecurity Professionals Poses Risk to National Security,” June 18, 2014, at 
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2014/06/18.html. Partnership for Public Service, Cyber In-Security II, Closing the 
Federal Talent Gap, April 2015, pp. 1 and 10. GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning 
and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 2011, pp. 20-21. RAND indicated that demand will likely be met over 
time due to an increased number of cybersecurity training and education programs. The GAO report notes that some 
agencies were able to fill needed cybersecurity positions, while others experienced challenges to filling such positions. 
22 GAO, Federal Workforce: OPM and Agencies Need to Strengthen Efforts to Identify and Close Mission-Critical 
Skills Gaps, GAO-15-223, January 30, 2015, pp. 2 and 15. 
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 agency strategic workforce plans that do not specifically address cybersecurity 
workforce needs.23 
DOD and DHS have reported recruitment and retention challenges for their cybersecurity 
workforces, including an inadequate number of qualified cybersecurity professionals.24 DOD and 
DHS have partly attributed these challenges to the following factors:  
 Federal hiring process – DOD noted that the length and complexity of the 
hiring process may deter cybersecurity professionals from pursuing federal 
careers.25 
 General Schedule (GS) pay system – DHS and other agencies believed that the 
GS system placed them at a competitive disadvantage for attracting cyber talent, 
noting that other agencies using non-GS systems were able to pay cybersecurity 
professionals higher salaries.26  
 Federal security clearance process – DOD and DHS cited the amount of time 
required to obtain security clearances for new employees as a barrier to filling 
cybersecurity positions.27 
Executive Branch Efforts to Define and Identify the 
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce 
The executive branch has several initiatives to define and identify the federal cybersecurity 
workforce: (1) the national cybersecurity workforce framework, (2) cybersecurity data codes, and 
(3) a federal cybersecurity workforce dataset. Laws aiming to define and identify the workforce 
mandate the use of these initiatives.  
The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework 
In November 2011, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), within the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), released the national cybersecurity 
workforce framework.28 The framework provides a consistent way to define and describe 
                                                 
23 GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 
2011, pp. 8-11. 
24 Ibid., p. 21; GAO, Defense Department Cyber Efforts, DOD Faces Challenges In Its Cyber Activities, GAO-11-75, 
July 2011, pp. 8-9, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321818.pdf; GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives 
Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 2011, p. 21; GAO, DHS Is Generally Filling 
Mission-Critical Positions, But Could Better Track Costs of Coordinated Recruiting Efforts, GAO-13-742, September 
2013, p. 24, at http://gao.gov/assets/660/657902.pdf; Homeland Security Advisory Council, CyberSkills Task Force 
Report, Fall 2012, p. 5, at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC%20CyberSkills%20Report%20-
%20Final.pdf. 
25 GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 
2011, pp. 21-22. 
26 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
27 Ibid. pp. 24-25; GAO, DHS Is Generally Filling Mission-Critical Positions, But Could Better Track Costs of 
Coordinated Recruiting Efforts, GAO-13-742, September 2013, p. 24. For more information on the federal security 
clearance process, see CRS Report R43216, Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by 
Michelle D. Christensen and Frederick M. Kaiser. 
28 National Institute of Standards and Technology (hereafter NIST), “NICE Issues Cybersecurity Workforce 
Framework for Public Comment,” November 8, 2011, at http://www.nist.gov/itl/cyberwork-110811.cfm. 
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cybersecurity work at any public or private organization, including federal agencies.29 The 
framework classifies and categorizes cybersecurity work under specialty areas, which are grouped 
into seven categories (Figure 1 illustrates these specialty areas and categories).30 Within each 
specialty area, the framework defines standard duties and competencies for cybersecurity 
professionals, as well as job titles that typically involve such duties.  
Figure 1. The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework  
(as illustrated by the Partnership for Public Service) 
 
Source: The figure is excerpted from Partnership for Public Service, Cyber In-Security II, Closing the Federal Talent 
Gap, April 2015, p. 8.  
Cybersecurity Data Codes 
In October 2012, OPM, in coordination with NIST, published a coding structure for federal 
cybersecurity positions based on the national cybersecurity workforce framework.31 The structure 
assigns unique numeric codes to each of the seven categories and specialty areas within the 
framework and three new categories not included in the framework: (1) Cybersecurity 
Program/Project Management; (2) Cybersecurity Supervision, Management, and Leadership; and 
(3) Not Applicable.32 The codes are intended to allow OPM and agencies to identify and 
                                                 
29 DHS, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (hereafter NICCS), “National Cybersecurity 
Workforce Framework,” at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/training/national-cybersecurity-workforce-framework. The 
framework was developed in collaboration with other federal agencies and private sector representatives. 
30 DHS, NICCS, “National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework,” at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/training/tc/framework. 
31 OPM, “The Use and Usefulness of the Cybersecurity Data Element,” December 6, 2012, PDF p. 2, at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/documents/december2012presentations/dec2012_cybersec_data_element.pdf. 
32 OPM, The Guide to Data Standards, Part A: Human Resources, November 15, 2014, PDF pp. 104-110, at 
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/data-policy-guidance/reporting-guidance/part-
a-human-resources.pdf. The guide includes procedures on how to properly assign the data codes to federal positions. 
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categorize all federal cybersecurity positions,33 thereby laying the groundwork for a consistent 
government-wide count of the federal cybersecurity workforce.  
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Dataset 
In June 2013, OPM launched an initiative to build and use a comprehensive dataset of existing 
and future executive branch cybersecurity positions.34 The initiative, known as the Special 
Cybersecurity Workforce Project, was created to support the FY2013 Cross-Agency Priority 
(CAP) goal to close cybersecurity workforce skills gaps.35 The project includes three phases:  
1. build a dataset of all federal cybersecurity positions,  
2. assess the accuracy of data contained therein, and  
3. use the dataset to identify and address needs of the federal cybersecurity 
workforce.36  
To support construction of the dataset, OPM directed agencies to assign OPM cybersecurity data 
codes to their positions. As of November 2015, roughly 95% of all federal positions (not just 
cybersecurity positions), and 96% of positions in the 2210 occupation series, had been assigned 
an OPM cybersecurity data code.37 The OPM dataset, as well as a government-wide count of the 
federal cybersecurity workforce, however, has not been released to the public. OPM staff did not 
indicate when the dataset would be available on OPM’s online workforce data portal, noting that 
the release date will depend on the accuracy of the data.38   
Cybersecurity Workforce Skills Gap Assessments 
On October 30, 2015, OMB issued the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP).39 
The CSIP directs agencies to, among other things, complete the following activities to identify 
skills gaps in the federal cybersecurity workforce:  
1. All agencies—identify their top five cyber talent gaps using OPM’s cybersecurity 
dataset.40  
2. OPM, DHS, and OMB—issue a report that maps “the entire cyber workforce 
landscape across all agencies using the NICE national cybersecurity workforce 
framework and identify cyber talent gaps and recommendations for closing 
them.”41  
                                                 
33 Ibid., PDF p. 104. 
34 OPM, memorandum from Elaine Kaplan, OPM Acting Director, to the heads of executive departments and agencies, 
“Special Cybersecurity Workforce Project,” July 8, 2013, at https://www.chcoc.gov/content/special-cybersecurity-
workforce-project. 
35Ibid. 
36 OPM, “A Strategic Perspective on the Federal Cybersecurity Work Function,” November 2014, pp. 4 and 6. 
37 Information provided to CRS from OPM staff via email on November 17, 2015. 
38 Ibid. 
39 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (hereafter OMB), memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of OMB, 
and Tony Scott, Federal Chief Information Officer, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
“Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) for the Federal Civilian Government,” M-16-04, October 30, 
2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-04.pdf. 
40 Ibid., p. 18. 
41 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Figure 2, below, includes key activities for OPM’s cybersecurity dataset initiative and related 
CSIP activities. OPM has completed Phase 1, anticipates completing Phase 2 by March 31, 2016, 
and anticipates beginning Phase 3 during the “latter part of FY2016.”42 These CSIP activities may 
accelerate planned implementation of Phase 3, as they require agencies to use the dataset for 
workforce planning purposes. 
Figure 2. Timeline for Building and Using OPM’s Cybersecurity Dataset 
 
Source: CRS analysis of OPM Special Cybersecurity Workforce Project documents and OMB’s Cybersecurity 
Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP); information provided to CRS from OPM staff via email on July 28, 
2015, and November 17, 2015. 
Notes: The graphic includes certain activities from the CSIP, which are not part of OPM’s original goals for the 
dataset initiative. The graphic is not exhaustive and may not capture the full range of activities for each phase. 
Efforts to Define and Identify the Federal 
Cybersecurity Workforce Through Legislation 
Two laws include provisions that aim to define and identify federal cybersecurity positions: 
3. The Border Patrol Pay Agent Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-277)43  
4. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113)44  
                                                 
42 Information provided to CRS from OPM staff via email on November 17, 2015. 
43 Enacted on December 18, 2014.  
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The laws codify, and in some ways enhance, OPM’s ongoing efforts to define and code federal 
cybersecurity positions since 2013. The laws also enhance OMB’s efforts to assess agencies’ 
cybersecurity workforce capabilities. Broadly, the laws require all agencies to (1) assign data 
codes to all cybersecurity positions according to the national cybersecurity workforce framework; 
(2) conduct critical needs assessments for identified cyber positions; and (3) submit progress 
reports on completing these tasks. Table 1, below, compares efforts to define, identify, and assess 
federal cybersecurity positions between the laws and the OPM/OMB directives described above.  
Table 1. Comparison of Laws and OPM/OMB Efforts to Identify, Code, and Assess 
Federal Cybersecurity Positions 
Requirement 
OPM directive 
(Jul 2013) 
P.L. 113-277, Sec. 4 
(Dec 2014) 
OMB directive 
(Oct 2015) 
P.L. 114-113, Division 
N,  
Title III (Dec 2015) 
Identification & 
coding 
Agencies to assign 
OPM 
cybersecurity data 
codes to all 
cybersecurity 
positions by 
December 31, 
2015. 
DHS to assign OPM 
cybersecurity data 
codes to all 
cybersecurity 
positions no later than 
nine months after the 
date of enactment 
(September 2015). 
Agencies to 
participate in OPM’s 
cybersecurity dataset 
project and report all 
cybersecurity 
positions to OPM by 
December 31, 2015. 
Agencies to assign OPM 
cybersecurity data codes, 
in coordination with NIST, 
to all cybersecurity 
positions no later than one 
year after the 
establishment of code 
assignment procedures. 
Baseline skills 
assessment 
No requirement. No requirement. No requirement. Provide baseline skills 
assessments of agencies’ 
cybersecurity workforces, 
including (1) the 
percentage of 
cybersecurity employees 
who possess appropriate 
industry-recognized 
certifications for their 
positions, (2) the level of 
preparedness of 
cybersecurity employees 
without credentials to 
acquire them, and (3) a 
strategy for mitigating gaps 
within these two areas. 
                                                                
(...continued) 
44 Enacted on December 18, 2015. The workforce provisions were included in Division N of Title III within the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, titled the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015. The 
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 originated in S. 2007 (114th Congress), which was 
introduced by Senator Bennett on August 6, 2015. Language from S. 2007 was subsequently included in Title III of the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (S. 754), which passed the Senate by a roll call vote of 74-21 on 
October 27, 2015. An amended version of S. 754 was included in Title III of Division N of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016. 
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Requirement 
OPM directive 
(Jul 2013) 
P.L. 113-277, Sec. 4 
(Dec 2014) 
OMB directive 
(Oct 2015) 
P.L. 114-113, Division 
N,  
Title III (Dec 2015) 
Skills gap 
assessments 
No requirement. DHS to, no later than 
18 months after 
enactment and annually 
until 2021, identify 
cybersecurity areas of 
critical need in its 
workforce, including 
those that face acute 
and emerging skill 
shortages. 
Agencies to identify 
the five cybersecurity 
specialty areas facing 
the largest talent 
gaps by December 
31, 2015. 
Agencies to, no later than 
one year after the 
assignment of cybersecurity 
codes and annually until 
2022, identify 
cybersecurity areas of 
critical need in their 
workforces, including 
those that face acute and 
emerging skill shortages. 
Oversight OPM to periodically 
monitor agencies’ 
progress in 
identifying and 
coding 
cybersecurity 
positions.  
DHS to submit formal 
progress reports to 
Congress on (1) 
identifying and coding 
cybersecurity 
positions, and (2) 
identifying 
cybersecurity areas of 
critical need. 
GAO to submit a 
report to Congress 
on the status of their 
implementation of the 
law no later than 
three years after the 
date of enactment. 
No requirement. Agencies to submit formal 
progress reports to 
Congress on identifying 
and coding cybersecurity 
positions.  
OPM to submit a formal 
progress report on 
identifying cybersecurity 
areas of critical need. 
GAO to submit a report 
to Congress on the status 
of implementation of the 
law no later than three 
years after the date of 
enactment. 
Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 113-277, P.L. 114-113, OPM Special Cybersecurity Workforce project documents, 
and OMB’s Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan. 
Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Applicable to 
DOD and DHS Cybersecurity Positions 
Congress has authorized hiring and pay flexibilities for DOD and DHS to enhance the recruitment 
and retention of cybersecurity professionals. OPM has also provided similar, but distinct, hiring 
flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions. The text box, below, provides a 
brief background on hiring and pay flexibilities.45  The subsections below discuss  
 selected hiring and pay flexibilities authorized by statute; 
 selected OPM-issued hiring flexibilities;  
 key functions of selected hiring and pay flexibilities; and 
 an analysis of selected statutory provisions on hiring and pay flexibilities. 
                                                 
45 This section does not discuss all hiring and pay flexibilities that can be used to fill federal cybersecurity positions. 
For a list of additional hiring and pay flexibilities applicable to federal cybersecurity positions, see OPM, memorandum 
from Mike Reinhold, Associate Director for Employee Services and Chief Human Capital Officer, “Cybersecurity 
Hiring, Pay, and Leave Flexibilities,” November 23, 2015, at https://www.chcoc.gov/content/cybersecurity-hiring-pay-
and-leave-flexibilities. The list does not include flexibilities that have been authorized by statute. 
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Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Defined 
Hiring flexibilities – Hiring flexibilities generally exempt agencies from certain competitive hiring requirements in 
the federal hiring process and allow for tailored recruitment. Hiring flexibilities aim to reduce time-to-hire and may 
allow agencies to better recruit qualified individuals that best meet their needs. Examples of hiring flexibilities include 
direct-hire authority and excepted service appointment authorities.46 Hiring flexibilities can be government-wide or 
agency-specific for one position or a group of positions. They can be issued by OPM or authorized by Congress.  
Pay flexibilities – Pay flexibilities provide employees with additional compensation in order to enhance the 
recruitment and retention of top talent to the federal government. In general, pay flexibilities can either permanently 
increase or temporarily supplement an employee’s base pay. They can also be performance or non-performance 
based. Examples of flexibilities that increase base pay include critical position pay authority and Quality Step Increases 
under the General Schedule (GS). Examples of flexibilities that supplement base pay include recruitment, relocation, 
and retention incentives and performance-based cash awards.47 Similar to hiring flexibilities, pay flexibilities can apply 
to one position or a group of positions. Some pay flexibilities are issued by OPM, while others are authorized by 
Congress. Several OPM-issued pay flexibilities can be used at an agency’s discretion, though some must be approved 
by OPM or OMB prior to use. 
Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Authorized by Statute 
Congress enacted three laws that authorize hiring and pay flexibilities applicable to cybersecurity 
positions at DOD and DHS:  
 P.L. 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 
 P.L. 113-277, the Border Patrol Pay Agent Reform Act of 2014 
 P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 
The flexibilities were first established in P.L. 104-201 for DOD intelligence positions, although 
they have been used to fill positions that perform cybersecurity functions. For example, the 
Department of the Army used the flexibilities to fill a “Senior Intelligence Advisor, Cyber” 
position.48 The hiring flexibilities authorized in P.L. 104-201 were used to justify establishing 
nearly identical flexibilities for cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. Table 2, below, briefly 
describes the coverage and legislative background of the three laws. 
Table 2. Statutory Authorities Governing Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities 
Applicable to DOD and DHS Cybersecurity Positions 
Feature P.L. 104-201, Sec. 1632 P.L. 113-277, Sec. 3 P.L. 114-92, Sec. 1107 
General 
authority 
Authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to (1) establish 
defense intelligence 
positions in the excepted 
service, and (2) fix the rates 
of pay for such positions. 
Authorizes the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to (1) 
establish cybersecurity 
positions in the excepted 
service, and (2) fix the rates of 
pay for such positions. 
Authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to (1) establish 
positions at and in support of 
the U.S. Cyber Command in the 
excepted service, and (2) fix the 
rates of pay for such positions. 
                                                 
46 For a list of certain hiring flexibilities, see OPM, Human Resources Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal 
Government, August 2013, pp. 17-18, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/reference-
materials/handbooks/humanresourcesflexibilitiesauthorities.pdf. 
47 For a list of pay flexibilities, see ibid., pp. 41-47 and 56-57. 
48 The vacancy announcement is closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/420013200. 
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Feature P.L. 104-201, Sec. 1632 P.L. 113-277, Sec. 3 P.L. 114-92, Sec. 1107 
Coverage DOD intelligence positions. DHS cybersecurity positions. DOD cybersecurity positions 
within and in support of the U.S. 
Cyber Command. 
Enactment date September 23, 1996 December 18, 2014 November 25, 2015 
U.S. Code 
citation 
10 U.S.C. §1601-1607 6 U.S.C. §147 N/A 
Legislative 
background 
First proposed in the Senate 
version of the NDAA for 
FY1995 (S. 1745, 104th 
Congress). Amended 
language from S. 1745 
incorporated into P.L. 104-
201. 
First proposed in the DHS 
Cybersecurity Workforce 
Recruitment and Retention 
Act of 2014 (S. 2354, 113th 
Congress). Language from S. 
2354 incorporated into P.L. 
113-277. 
First proposed in the Senate 
version of the NDAA for 
FY2016 (S. 1376, 114th 
Congress). Language from S. 
1376 incorporated into P.L. 114-
92. 
References to 
flexibilities in 
P.L. 104-201 
N/A A Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs report 
accompanying S. 2354 noted 
that flexibilities in P.L. 104-201 
have enabled DOD to “build 
and maintain a strong 
cybersecurity workforce” and 
that similar flexibilities were 
“needed by DHS to address 
the ever-growing cyber threat 
to our national and economic 
security.” 
A Senate Committee on Armed 
Services report accompanying S. 
1376 noted that the flexibilities 
proposed therein were modeled 
after the flexibilities in P.L. 104-
201 and are “a very important 
factor in attracting and retaining 
the high caliber of personnel 
that are critical to the execution 
of the cyber warfare mission of 
the department [DOD].” 
Source: CRS analysis of the laws cited in the table. 
a. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, DHS Cybersecurity 
Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014, report to accompany S. 2354, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 
113-207 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), pp. 2-3.  
b. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016, report 
to accompany S. 1376, 114th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 114-49 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015), pp. 219-220. 
Selected OPM-Issued Hiring Flexibilities  
OPM has also issued temporary hiring flexibilities for a limited number of cybersecurity positions 
at DOD and DHS.49 The positions must require unique cybersecurity skills and knowledge that 
are explicitly specified in the flexibilities. The DOD flexibility must be used to fill positions 
within certain occupational series, while the DHS flexibility does not include such limitations. 
The DHS flexibility appears to be an interim recruiting solution for cybersecurity professionals 
until the regulations governing the hiring and pay flexibilities under P.L. 113-277 become 
effective. Table 3, below, summarizes key features of the flexibilities. 
                                                 
49 OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80 Federal Register 12045, March 5, 2015, at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/03/05/2015-05185/excepted-service; OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80 
Federal Register 69726, November 10, 2015, at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/11/10/2015-
28566/excepted-service. 
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Table 3. OPM-Issued Hiring Flexibilities for Cybersecurity Positions 
Feature DOD Cybersecurity Positions DHS Cybersecurity Positions 
Number of 
positions 
Up to 3,000. Up to 1,000. 
Coverage Positions that require unique cybersecurity skills and knowledge to perform: (1) cyber risk 
and strategic analysis, (2) incident handling and malware/vulnerability analysis, (3) program 
management, (4) distributed control systems security, (5) cyber incident response, (6) cyber 
exercise facilitation and management, (7) cyber vulnerability detection and assessment, (8) 
network and systems engineering, (9) enterprise architecture, (10) investigation, (11) 
investigative analysis, and (12) cyber-related infrastructure inter-dependency analysis.  
Occupational series Department-wide: Security (GS-0080), 
computer engineers (GS-0854), electronic 
engineers (GS-0855), computer scientists 
(GS-1550), operations research (GS-1515), 
criminal investigators (GS-1811), 
telecommunications (GS-0391), IT specialists 
(GS-2210).  
U.S. Cyber Command: Administrative and 
program series (GS-0301). 
Not specified. 
Applicable grades GS-9 to GS-15 
Appointment type Permanent, time-limited, or temporary. Not specified. 
Expiration date 
(date upon which 
hires must be 
completed) 
December 31, 2015 June 30, 2016, or until the regulations 
governing hiring and pay flexibilities 
authorized under P.L. 113-277 become 
effective (whichever comes first). 
Source: OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80 Federal Register 12045, March 5, 2015, at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/03/05/2015-05185/excepted-service; OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80 
Federal Register 69726, November 10, 2015, at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/11/10/2015-
28566/excepted-service. 
Notes: The DHS authority also includes “intelligence analysis” as a required skill.  
Key Functions of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities  
The aforementioned hiring and pay flexibilities aim, respectively, to enhance the recruitment and 
retention of cybersecurity professionals at DOD and DHS by (1) designating cybersecurity 
positions as within the excepted service, and (2) allowing for additional compensation for 
cybersecurity professionals. The OPM-issued flexibilities do not explicitly authorize the use of 
the pay flexibilities.   
Hiring Flexibilities: Excepted Service Designation 
The hiring flexibilities described above allow covered DOD and DHS positions to be placed in 
the excepted service (see text box below for an explanation). As a result, DOD and DHS are not 
subject to the competitive hiring requirements in Title 5 of the United States Code that are placed 
on other agencies for covered positions. Rather, the authorized agencies can use alternative (and 
often agency-developed) recruitment, assessment, and selection methods for the positions that are 
sometimes seen as more flexible and efficient than regular competitive hiring procedures. These 
alternative hiring procedures are intended to allow for streamlined and tailored recruitment, 
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which could expedite the hiring process. For example, DOD and DHS may waive public notice 
requirements, including posting job announcements on USAJobs.gov, for covered positions.50 
This exception might allow the departments to reduce the number of applications to review and 
hire from a narrower group of individuals, thereby accelerating the hiring process.  
The Excepted Service  
The federal workforce includes the competitive service, excepted service, and Senior Executive Service. The 
competitive service includes the majority of executive branch positions, and includes positions that are open to all 
applicants and require a competitive process to acquire the position. The Senior Executive Service (SES) consists of 
executive management positions that oversee activities in approximately 75 agencies. The excepted service includes 
positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES.51 
According to OPM, excepted service designations are provided “to fill special jobs or to fill any job in unusual or 
special circumstances,” thereby enabling “agencies to hire when it is not feasible or not practical to use traditional 
competitive hiring procedures.”52 Individuals that meet an excepted service position’s eligibility and minimum 
qualification requirements do not have to compete with other applicants. Excepted service designations can be issued 
by OPM or authorized by Congress. Flexibilities authorized by statute are distinct from OPM-issued flexibilities and 
can be implemented without OPM approval. Their structure and functions might differ.  
Pay Flexibilities: Additional Compensation 
The laws described above provide DOD and DHS with the opportunity to offer cybersecurity 
professionals additional compensation that is not typically available to all federal employees. The 
flexibilities seek to increase DOD’s and DHS’s abilities to compete for top cybersecurity talent. A 
report accompanying the DHS Cybersecurity Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014, 
for example, asserted that the pay flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions provide DOD with 
“significant latitude in setting pay and benefits [for cybersecurity positions], adding on regional 
or other adjustments to pay, and offering further specific financial incentives.”53 
Fixed Rates of Pay 
The laws for DOD and DHS authorize the departments to fix salaries for positions covered under 
their respective workforce flexibilities at rates of comparable DOD positions and fill such 
positions without regard to the classification and compensation requirements in any other law.54 
Using these flexibilities, the departments can establish alternative pay systems outside of the GS 
system and develop their own criteria for setting and adjusting salaries for positions within that 
system.55 According to a 2011 GAO report on the federal cybersecurity workforce, characteristics 
                                                 
50 Public notice requirements specified in 5 U.S.C. §3327, 5 U.S.C. §3330, and 5 C.F.R. Part 330, Subpart A only apply 
to competitive service positions. 
51 5 U.S.C. §2103; OPM, “Hiring Authorities, Competitive Hiring, Overview,” at http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/hiring-authorities/competitive-hiring/#url=Overview; and OPM, “Hiring Authorities, Excepted Service,” at 
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-authorities/excepted-service/. 
52 OPM, “Hiring Authorities, Excepted Service”; 5 C.F.R. Part 213. 
53 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, DHS Cybersecurity Workforce 
Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014, report to accompany S. 2354, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 113-207 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), p. 2. 
54 10 U.S.C. §1601(b); 10 U.S.C. §1602(a); 6 U.S.C. §147(b)(2)(A); 6 U.S.C. §147(b)(1)(B); P.L. 114-92, sec.1107. 
55 Use of alternative personnel systems can be authorized by OPM or Congress. For more information on alternative 
personnel systems authorized by OPM, see OPM, “Alternative Personnel Systems, About APS,” at 
http://archive.opm.gov/aps/about/index.aspx; and OPM, “Alternative Personnel Systems, Frequently Asked Questions,” 
at http://archive.opm.gov/aps/about/faq/index.aspx. 
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of certain non-GS systems can allow agencies to offer employees higher salaries compared to 
their GS system-bound counterparts.56 As stated earlier, agencies have argued that non-GS 
systems can increase an agency’s ability to attract and retain cybersecurity professionals.57  
Additional Monetary Incentives 
Individuals filling DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions through the flexibilities authorized by 
statute are eligible for additional monetary incentives.58 These incentives can include one-time 
cash payments or base pay increases and can be performance or non-performance based. In many 
cases, these incentives can be given to all federal employees.59 For example, regarding non-
performance based flexibilities, all agencies have the discretion to provide recruitment incentives 
for positions that would be difficult to fill in the absence of such an incentive.60 Agencies also 
have the discretion to provide performance-based cash awards to employees for work that 
“contributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations.”61  
Some monetary incentives authorized under the DOD and DHS laws, however, are only available 
to employees covered under the laws and can allow these employees—including cybersecurity 
professionals—to earn higher base salaries (exclusive of locality-pay adjustments) than their GS 
counterparts. For example, cybersecurity employees covered under the Defense Civilian 
Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) can receive awards that cause their base salaries to 
exceed the maximum pay rate of their position’s grade, while GS employees cannot (the text box 
below provides an example). DCIPS62 is a DOD-specific, alternative personnel management 
system that encompasses DOD intelligence positions covered under P.L. 104-201 and includes a 
General Grade (GG) salary structure that aligns with the GS system’s 15-grade structure.63  
Higher Salaries for Cybersecurity Employees: GS and DCIPS 
The scenarios below demonstrate how awards that increase base pay can allow cybersecurity employees covered 
under DCIPS to earn higher annual salaries compared to their GS counterparts. For the purposes of these scenarios, 
a base pay increase is defined as a two-step increase within a position’s grade (e.g., GS-7, Step 1 to GS-7, Step 3).  
GS – A federal employee is currently in a GS-15, Step 10 position—the maximum step of the highest grade. The 
employee receives the highest possible performance rating (“outstanding” or equivalent). The employee is not eligible 
for a two-step base pay increase within a GS grade, as the employee’s base salary cannot exceed the maximum step of 
the GS-15 grade.64 The employee’s salary remains at the GS-15, step 10 level.65 If the employee does not receive a 
cash award (i.e., bonus), the performance level achieved may not be recognized. 
                                                 
56 For a list of these characteristics, see Table 7 in GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better 
Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 2011, p. 30. 
57Ibid., pp. 29-31.  
58 10 U.S.C. §1603; 6 U.S.C. §147(b)(3); P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107. The incentives cannot exceed the amounts authorized 
for comparable Title 5 positions. 
59 For more information on monetary incentives that can be accessed by all agencies, see OPM, Human Resources 
Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal Government, August 2013, pp. 41-47 and 56-57. 
60 Ibid., p. 41; 5 U.S.C. §5753; 5 C.F.R. Part 575, Subpart A. 
61 OPM, Human Resources Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal Government, August 2013, p. 56; 5 U.S.C. 
§4503; 5 C.F.R. §451.104(a)(1).  
62 For more information on DCIPS, see DOD, “Defense Civilian Personnel Intelligence System,” at 
http://dcips.dtic.mil/. 
63 DOD, “Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) GG Grade Ranges for 2016, PDF p. 
1, at http://dcips.dtic.mil/documents/DCIPS_Pay_Rates-2016.pdf. 
64 A two-step base-pay increase within a GS grade is known as a Quality Step Increase (QSI). Employees at the top of 
their grade level (step 10) are not eligible for QSIs. For more information on QSIs, see 5 U.S.C. §5336, 5 C.F.R. Part 
(continued...) 
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DCIPS – A federal employee is currently in a GG-15, Step 10 position—the maximum step of the highest grade.66 
The employee has been in the GG-15 grade for at least three consecutive performance periods and has received the 
highest possible performance rating (“outstanding,” or a performance rating that places the employee in the top 10% 
among his or her peers for those three periods). The employee is eligible for a two-step base-pay increase within the 
GG-15 grade, as DCIPS allows employees to exceed the maximum step of the GG-15 grade upon receiving a 
performance award.67 The employee’s base salary increases to a level that exceeds the GS-15, Step 10 base 
maximum.68 
Analysis of Selected Statutory Provisions for Hiring and Pay 
Flexibilities 
This section includes an analysis of selected provisions from the three laws authorizing hiring and 
pay flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions (P.L. 104-201), DHS cybersecurity positions (P.L. 
113-277), and DOD cybersecurity positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command (P.L. 114-
92). The analysis highlights key structural differences between the selected provisions. Appendix 
A includes a side-by-side analysis of key provisions in each of the laws. 
Probationary Period 
New employees hired into DOD or DHS cybersecurity positions are subject to a three-year 
probationary period.69 While no similar extended probationary period is statutorily required for 
DOD intelligence personnel, DOD has instituted a two-year “trial period” for many of these 
positions.70 In addition, existing DOD and DHS cybersecurity employees that are scheduled to be 
converted to the excepted service have the right to refuse moving to the excepted service. The law 
governing DOD intelligence positions contains no similar language. Employees in the excepted 
service cannot apply for career and career-conditional federal jobs (i.e., jobs that are not open to 
all U.S. citizens) and therefore might be less inclined to accepted the conversion.71  
                                                                
(...continued) 
531, Subpart E; and OPM, “Fact Sheet, Quality Step Increase,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-
leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/quality-step-increase/. 
65 The GS-15, Step 10 salary rates vary by locality. For a list of 2016 GS pay rates, see OPM, “2016 General Schedule 
(GS) Locality Pay Tables,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2016/general-
schedule/. 
66 DOD, “Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) GG Grade Ranges for 2016,” January 10, 2016, 
PDF p. 1. 
67 A two-step base-pay increase within a DCIPS grade is known as a Sustained Quality Increase (SQI). Unlike the GS, 
employees at the top of their grade level (step 10) are eligible for SQIs. For more information on SQIs, see DOD, 
“DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) Awards and 
Recognition, DOD Instruction Number 1400.25, Volume 2008, October 4, 2015,  pp. 9-11, at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/140025_vol2008.pdf.   
68 See, for example: OPM, “Salary Table 2016-GS,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-
wages/salary-tables/pdf/2016/GS.pdf; DOD, “Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) GG Grade 
Ranges for 2016,” January 10, 2016, PDF p. 1.  
69 The standard probationary period for a new federal employee in a competitive service position is one year. See 5 
C.F.R. §315.801 and 5 .C.F.R. §315.802. 
70 DOD, “DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) 
Awards and Recognition, DOD Instruction Number 1400.25, Volume 2008, October 4, 2015, pp. 13-14. The DCIPS 
trial period is similar to the federal probationary period, during which an employee can be removed at will. 
71 For more information on career and career-conditional employment, see 5 C.F.R. Part 315, Subpart B. 
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Implementation Plan 
The laws for DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions require an implementation plan describing 
how the hiring and pay flexibilities will be used, while the law for DOD intelligence positions 
does not. The content and submission requirements, however, differ between plans. P.L. 114-92 
requires DOD to submit an implementation plan to Congress prior to using the flexibilities. The 
flexibilities will only become effective 30 days after Congress receives the plan. In addition, the 
plan’s content must include “(1) an assessment of the scope of positions covered by the 
flexibilities, (2) a plan for using the flexibilities, and (3) an assessment of the anticipated 
workforce needs of the U.S. Cyber Command across the future-years’ defense plan.”72 P.L. 113-
277, in contrast, does not require DHS to include specific information in the implementation plan, 
nor does it preclude DHS from using the flexibilities therein prior to submitting the plan.  
Reporting Requirements  
DOD and DHS are required to report annually on the use of hiring and pay flexibilities for 
covered cybersecurity positions. The reports’ content requirements are identical and must include 
recruitment and retention data—such as the number of hires, separations, and retirements for 
covered cybersecurity positions—among other things.73 The report authors and submission 
timelines, however, differ. P.L. 113-277 directs DHS to develop the annual report, while P.L. 114-
92 requires OPM, in coordination with DOD, to develop the report. Further, the plan for DHS 
flexibilities must be submitted annually for four years after the date of enactment, compared to 
annually for five years after the date of enactment under the plan for DOD flexibilities. The law 
for DOD intelligence positions does not contain any reporting requirements. 
Congressional Oversight Issues 
Congress has shown an interest in ensuring that the federal cybersecurity workforce is defined 
and identified.74 Congress has also shown an interest in ensuring that hiring and pay flexibilities 
for cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS are properly implemented and achieve their 
intended purposes.75 If such interest continues, Congress could enhance its oversight of these 
efforts to increase its awareness and knowledge of their implementation. The subsections below 
discuss potential issues in the absence of enhanced congressional oversight related to (1) 
identifying and defining the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) hiring and pay flexibilities 
that can be used to fill DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions.  
Identifying and Defining the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce 
Efforts to define and identify federal cybersecurity workforce positions have largely been 
undertaken by OPM. OPM, however, is not currently required to report on its progress in 
identifying and coding all federal cybersecurity positions to Congress, nor has it released its 
cybersecurity dataset or a government-wide count of the cybersecurity workforce to Congress. 
Further, OMB’s CSIP does not require agencies to report identified skills gaps in their 
cybersecurity workforces to Congress. Congressional knowledge of the progress of these 
                                                 
72 P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107. 
73 A comprehensive list of these content requirements can be found in Appendix B. 
74 See, for example, P.L. 114-113, Division N, Title III. 
75 See, for example, P.L. 113-277, sec. 3, and P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107. 
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evolving efforts, therefore, might be limited or incomplete, which might make it difficult for 
Congress to (1) identify potential conflicting efforts between OMB, OPM, and Congress in 
assessing the capabilities of the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) gauge the utility of 
hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. 
Potential Conflicting Efforts to Assess the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce 
The lack of a requirement for progress reports may make it difficult for Congress to identify or 
prevent potentially conflicting efforts to assess the capabilities of the federal cybersecurity 
workforce between existing laws and OMB/OPM directives. For example, as stated previously, 
P.L. 113-277 first required DHS to identify cybersecurity specialty areas of critical need 
(including those facing acute and emerging skills gaps) by June 2015, and the CSIP later required 
all agencies to identify the five cybersecurity specialty areas facing the largest talent gaps by 
December 31, 2015. OPM was required to issue guidance to help DHS identify its cybersecurity 
areas of critical need. OPM then issued new guidance to help agencies identify their top five 
cyber talent gaps.76 If OPM’s new guidance differs substantially from the guidance provided to 
DHS, the positions DHS originally identified as facing gaps might not align with those identified 
using OPM’s new procedures. This might affect DHS’s efforts to address staffing needs. 
Utility of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities  
Congress’s knowledge of agencies’ cybersecurity workforce capabilities and needs might be 
affected by lack of access to OPM’s dataset and lack of formal notification about cybersecurity 
skills gaps identified through the CSIP. Consequently, it might be difficult for Congress to 
definitively determine the need for or the proper structure of hiring and pay flexibilities to address 
those needs. This could lead to the absence of certain hiring and pay flexibilities, authorization of 
new flexibilities that are not necessarily needed, or the realization that existing flexibilities do 
apply to the specific agency components. For instance, suppose a federal department identifies 
cybersecurity skills gaps in one of its major components without a full and accurate count of its 
workforce and Congress subsequently authorizes hiring and pay flexibilities to fill those 
positions. If the agency, after accurately measuring the size and composition of its workforce, 
determines that a different component faces skills gaps, the existing flexibilities would not help to 
address such gaps. 
Issues Related to Hiring and Pay Flexibilities for DOD and DHS 
Cybersecurity Positions 
The laws governing flexibilities for DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions require the 
departments to report to Congress on their use, while neither the law for DOD intelligence 
positions nor the OPM-issued flexibilities do. Further, existing reporting requirements for the 
flexibilities do not require the departments to identify challenges to using the flexibilities or to 
measure their effectiveness. DOD and DHS have broad discretion to determine the structure and 
implementation of statutorily authorized hiring and pay flexibilities, such as what positions the 
flexibilities apply to and how they are to be used. This discretion can create the potential for 
discrepancies between the intended and actual use of the flexibilities. Were Congress to be 
                                                 
76 OPM, memorandum from Mark Reinhold, Associate Director of Employee Services, to Chief Human Capital 
Officers and Chief Information Officers, “Guidance for Identifying Top Five Cyber Talent Gaps,” November 23, 2015, 
at https://www.chcoc.gov/content/guidance-identifying-top-five-cyber-talent-gaps. The resource charts are on OMB’s 
MAX website and are only accessible by executive branch agency staff. 
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interested in identifying and addressing any potential discrepancies, as well as gauging the 
flexibilities’ effectiveness in improving the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity 
professionals at DOD and DHS, it might need to enhance its oversight by clarifying reporting 
requirements.   
The subsections below discuss issues related to (1) usage data and its potential impact, (2) 
effectiveness measurement, and (3) training with regard to the DOD and DHS hiring and pay 
flexibilities. 
Lack of Data on Use of Certain Cybersecurity Hiring Flexibilities at DOD and 
DHS  
The law for DOD intelligence positions, and the OPM-issued hiring flexibilities for certain DOD 
and DHS cybersecurity positions, do not require the departments to report, among other things, 
(1) the total number of employees hired using the flexibilities,77 (2) the specific types of positions 
filled through the flexibilities, or (3) in which components the positions are located. A lack of 
data on the use of hiring and pay flexibilities could reduce Congress’s ability to determine how 
much they are used and to what effect.  
Appropriate Use of Flexibilities 
In the absence of data on use of the flexibilities issued by OPM or authorized under the law for 
DOD intelligence positions, Congress might find it difficult to ensure that these flexibilities are 
being used to fill appropriate positions. For example, at least one cybersecurity workforce expert 
expressed concern that DHS may have used a past OPM-issued cybersecurity hiring flexibility to 
fill non-cybersecurity positions.78  
Maximized Use of Flexibilities 
The absence of data may make it difficult for Congress to determine to what extent the 
flexibilities are used, and what challenges may inhibit their maximum use. Ultimately, this could 
affect future decisions regarding the authorization of additional flexibilities or changes to the 
structure of existing flexibilities. For example, suppose that DHS uses the OPM-issued hiring 
flexibility to fill 200 cybersecurity positions—20% of the maximum allowed by the flexibility (up 
to 1,000 positions). If DHS had no additional positions to fill, additional flexibilities might not be 
needed. If DHS encountered implementation challenges that prevented further use of the 
flexibility, however, structural changes to the flexibility may be needed. Similarly, suppose that 
DHS does not use the pay flexibilities authorized under P.L. 113-277. While the lack of use could 
indicate that the flexibilities are not needed, it may also stem from budget constraints. 
                                                 
77 Section 301 of the House-passed version of the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 
2014 (H.R. 3696, 113th Congress) included a provision that would have required DHS to report the total number of 
individuals hired under a past OPM-issued cybersecurity hiring flexibility, suggesting that such data are not readily 
available to Congress.  
78 In May 2014, Alan Paller, an expert on the federal cybersecurity workforce and one of the authors of DHS’s 
Cybersecurity Task Force Report, wrote in the SANS.org newsletter that “DHS IT managers hijacked [the hiring 
authority] to hire people, without cyber skills, for regular IT roles, bypassing normal hiring rules.” See SANS, 
“Newsletters: Newsbites,” Volume XVI – Issue #39, at http://www.sans.org/newsletters/newsbites/xvi/39. SANS is “a 
cooperative research and education organization. Its programs now reach more than 165,000 security professionals 
around the world.” See SANS, “About,” at http://www.sans.org/about/.  
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Utility of Flexibilities for the U.S. Cyber Command 
A lack of data on how frequently the flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions are being used to 
fill positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command may make it difficult for Congress to gauge 
the utility of new flexibilities authorized for Command positions under P.L. 114-92. It appears 
that some positions affiliated with the Command are being filled using the existing flexibilities 
for DOD intelligence positions. The Departments of the Army and Navy, for example, are using 
the flexibilities to fill cybersecurity positions in units that support the Command.79 The 
flexibilities, therefore, might not be needed as much or used as often as envisioned if a sizeable 
portion of covered positions can be filled using existing flexibilities. 
Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities 
Existing reporting requirements for the hiring and pay flexibilities measure the use of hiring and 
pay flexibilities, but do not necessarily measure their effectiveness. For example, the law for DHS 
cybersecurity positions requires the department to detail how it plans to recruit and retain 
employees in cybersecurity positions and how it will measure progress in doing so. The laws do 
not, however, task DHS and DOD with determining whether and in what ways specific aspects of 
the hiring and pay flexibilities improved the departments’ ability to attract and retain qualified 
cybersecurity professionals, or whether these professionals have improved the quality and 
capacity of the departments’ cybersecurity workforces.  
Training on Structure and Use of Flexibilities  
The laws governing flexibilities for DOD intelligence, DHS cybersecurity, and DOD 
cybersecurity positions at the U.S. Cyber Command do not include provisions to require human 
resources staff (including component-level hiring managers and department-level staff in the 
Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer) to receive training on the availability, structure, and 
operation of cybersecurity hiring and pay flexibilities. Rather, P.L. 113-277 and P.L. 114-92 
require DOD and DHS to describe the training provided to supervisors using the flexibilities in 
the aforementioned annual reports to Congress.  
A lack of staff training might impact effective use of the flexibilities. Untrained hiring managers 
and human resources staff might not know about the flexibilities, the positions they apply to, how 
to properly implement them, and the positions for which they are most appropriate. For example, 
as mentioned earlier, it appears that certain cybersecurity positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber 
Command could be filled under the flexibilities authorized under P.L. 104-201 or P.L. 114-92.  
Oversight Policy Options 
Pursuant to its oversight authority, Congress could consider several oversight policy options to 
enhance its knowledge and awareness of identification and recruitment efforts for the federal 
cybersecurity workforce. Seven options are presented in this section, though other policy options 
exist. The first two policy options relate to monitoring OPM and OMB initiatives to define and 
identify federal cybersecurity positions. The remaining five options relate to monitoring the 
                                                 
79 The vacancy announcements are closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at: 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/423794200 and 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/417782000. The announcements are for vacancies in the U.S. Army 
Intelligence and Security Command and U.S. Cyber Fleet Command, which support the U.S. Cyber Command. 
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implementation of hiring and pay flexibilities used to fill DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions. 
CRS takes no position on the advisability of these and other potential policy options. 
This section does not present broader policy options that address the capabilities of the federal 
cybersecurity workforce, such as the establishment of additional hiring and pay flexibilities, other 
personnel tools that could be used to recruit and retain cybersecurity professionals, and whether 
federal cybersecurity professionals are enabling agencies to fulfill their respective missions.  
1. Notification of Progress on OPM Cybersecurity Dataset  
OPM could be required to notify appropriate congressional committees on the status of the 
cybersecurity dataset, including when the dataset is completed and released to the public on 
OPM’s online workforce data portal. In exercising its oversight authority, Congress may require 
these notifications to occur annually, semi-annually, quarterly, or on any other standard timeline. 
OPM could also be required to brief appropriate congressional committees on the structure and 
functions of the dataset upon its release. This could include (but not be limited to) the data it 
presents, how the data can be used to generate a government-wide count of the cybersecurity 
workforce, how it will be kept up to date, and anticipated enhancements and adjustments to be 
made.  
2. GAO Evaluation of OPM Cybersecurity Dataset 
As mentioned previously, P.L. 113-277 and P.L. 114-113 require GAO to submit a report to 
Congress describing the status of identifying, coding, and evaluating critical needs of 
cybersecurity positions at DHS and executive branch agencies. The laws do not, however, 
explicitly require GAO to evaluate OPM’s dataset. In its oversight capacity, Congress could 
additionally direct GAO to study the operation and effectiveness of the OPM cybersecurity 
dataset one year after it becomes operational. The study could evaluate, whether the dataset and 
OPM cybersecurity data codes accomplish the goals listed below. The study could also evaluate 
the validity of reported skills gaps in agencies’ cybersecurity positions.   
(1) identify positions for which the primary function is cybersecurity; 
(2) enable OPM and agencies to determine the baseline capabilities of the workforce, 
examine hiring trends, identify skills gaps, and more effectively recruit, hire, train, 
develop, and retain an effective cybersecurity workforce; 
(3) allow HR professionals to better understand the workforce and what issues need to be 
addressed; and 
(4) provide a platform for organizations outside of the federal government to similarly 
organize their cybersecurity professionals.
80
 
3. Conform Reporting Requirements for DOD and DHS 
Flexibilities 
Congress could amend existing statues to extend the reporting requirements articulated in the law 
for DHS cybersecurity positions—or the law for DOD cybersecurity positions—to DOD 
                                                 
80 OPM, “The Use and Usefulness of the Cybersecurity Data Element,” December 6, 2012, PDF p. 4. These are the 
intended goals of the OPM cybersecurity data codes, which align with the goals for OPM’s cybersecurity dataset 
initiative. 
The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce: Background and Congressional Oversight Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 21 
intelligence positions. Congress could also add a new reporting provision that requires DOD and 
DHS to provide information on any challenges encountered in implementing the flexibilities 
under P.L. 104-201, P.L. 114-92, and P.L. 113-277. Reporting requirements enhance 
congressional oversight of the hiring and pay flexibilities used for DOD intelligence positions. In 
addition, the reporting requirements might allow Congress to compare the use of the DOD and 
DHS hiring and pay flexibilities.  
4. Additional Data on DOD Flexibilities 
Congress could include the metrics listed below in the annual reporting requirements for DOD 
intelligence positions (P.L. 104-201) and DOD positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command 
(P.L. 114-92). The metrics could provide Congress with greater clarity on the extent to which the 
flexibilities under the laws are being used to fill cybersecurity positions. Such clarity might better 
position Congress to determine the utility of the flexibilities and the need (or lack thereof) for 
additional flexibilities for DOD cybersecurity positions.  
For DOD intelligence positions (P.L. 104-201): 
1. Total number of covered cybersecurity positions filled using the hiring 
flexibilities authorized by P.L. 104-201. 
2. Total number of covered cybersecurity positions filled using other hiring 
flexibilities. 
3. Percentage of filled cybersecurity positions that are affiliated with the U.S. Cyber 
Command. 
For DOD positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command (P.L. 114-49): 
1. Total number of covered cybersecurity positions filled using the hiring 
flexibilities authorized by P.L. 114-49.  
2. Total number of covered positions filled using other hiring flexibilities. 
3. Percentage of covered positions filled through other existing hiring flexibilities. 
5. Additional Data on OPM-Issued Flexibilities 
DOD and DHS could be required to report their use of OPM-issued hiring flexibilities for 
cybersecurity positions. The requirements could include, (1) the number of positions filled using 
the flexibility; (2) the pay plan, occupation, series, and grade of the position; (3) the nature of 
action of each hire; and (4) any challenges encountered in implementing the flexibilities. Such 
data might enhance Congress’s capacity to determine the extent to which these flexibilities are 
being, or have been used—and any barriers to maximizing their use. This information could, in 
turn, assist Congress in addressing any barriers to using statutorily authorized flexibilities and 
determining the utility of additional flexibilities. 
6. Training for DOD and DHS Staff on Flexibilities 
DOD and DHS could be required to provide training on the proper use and implementation of the 
hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions to hiring managers and human resources 
staff listed below.81 Congress could require the training to include a review of the existing 
                                                 
81 These training requirements could apply to contractors fulfilling the positions listed below. 
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authorities that can be applied to cybersecurity positions. Training might allow staff to better 
understand when and how to use the flexibilities. 
1. Department-level human resources (HR) staff that manage the civilian 
workforce 
This could include staff within the Office of Chief Human Capital Officer 
(CHCO), as well as other HR units that might be involved in civilian workforce 
issues. 
2. Department and component-level staff that develop implementing guidance 
for hiring and pay flexibilities 
DHS and DOD often issue implementing guidance for hiring and pay flexibilities 
at the department and component levels. It might be useful for staff charged with 
issuing implementing guidance to receive training on the structure and functions 
of the flexibilities. 
3. Component-level supervisors and hiring managers that use, or would use, 
the flexibilities 
DHS and DOD supervisors and hiring managers that use, or would use, the 
flexibilities might also benefit from training.  
7. Report on the Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities 
The Inspectors General at DOD and DHS could be required to report on how effective the hiring 
and pay flexibilities authorized through statute—and the specific features—have been in 
recruiting and retaining qualified cybersecurity professionals. For example, the reports could 
include an analysis of whether the hiring flexibilities reduced time to hire, and whether the 
reduced time to hire attracted qualified cybersecurity professionals to the departments,82 whether 
monetary incentives were a primary factor in attracting and retaining cybersecurity professionals 
to the federal government, which types of monetary incentives were most effective in doing so 
(e.g., performance awards or student loan repayments), and potentially other related matters. 
                                                 
82 For the purposes of this report, time to hire is defined as the total number of days between an applicant job interview 
and a conditional job offer. 
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Appendix A. Side-by-Side Analysis of Selected 
Provisions from Statutory Authorities for DOD 
Intelligence, DHS Cybersecurity, and DOD 
Positions at the U.S. Cyber Command 
Provision 
DOD Intelligence  
(P.L. 104-201, sec. 1632) 
DHS Cybersecurity 
(P.L. 113-277, sec. 3) 
DOD Cyber Command 
(P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107) 
Title Management of Civilian 
Intelligence Personnel 
Cybersecurity Recruitment 
and Retention 
U.S. Cyber Command 
Recruitment and Retention 
Date of enactment September 23, 1996 December 18, 2014 November 25, 2015 
General authority Authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to (1) establish 
defense intelligence positions 
in the excepted service, 
including those identified as 
Defense Intelligence Senior 
Level and Defense Intelligence 
Senior Executive Service 
positions established under 10 
U.S.C. §1606-1607; and (2) 
appoint qualified individuals to 
such positions. 
Authorizes the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to (1) 
establish cybersecurity 
positions in the excepted 
service, including those 
formerly identified as Senior 
Executive Service (SES) or 
Senior Level (SL); and (2) 
appoint qualified individuals 
to such positions. 
Authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to (1) establish 
positions at and in support 
of the U.S. Cyber Command 
in the excepted service, and 
(2) appoint qualified 
individuals to such positions. 
Covered positions Civilian intelligence positions 
as an intelligence officer or 
intelligence employee of a 
DOD intelligence component. 
Positions in which 
individuals perform, manage, 
or supervise cybersecurity 
responsibilities. 
Positions within the U.S. 
Cyber Command, elements 
of the Command enterprise 
relating to cyberspace 
operations, and military 
branch elements supporting 
the Command. 
Removal of certain 
legal hiring 
requirements 
Authorizes respective Secretaries to fill covered positions without regard to appointment, 
number, classification, and compensation requirements in any other law. 
Rates of basic pay Allows the Secretary to fix 
rates of basic pay for covered 
positions to rates of 
comparable DOD positions. 
Maximum pay cannot exceed 
“established for DOD 
employees by law or 
regulation.” 
Allows the Secretary to fix 
rates of basic pay for 
covered positions to rates 
for comparable positions in 
DOD. Maximum pay rates 
are subject to the same 
limitations imposed on 
comparable DOD positions. 
Allows the Secretary to fix 
rates of basic pay for 
covered positions to rates 
for comparable positions in 
DOD (i.e., those that 
perform, manage, or 
supervise functions that 
execute DOD’s cyber 
mission). Maximum pay rates 
are subject to the same 
limitations imposed on 
comparable DOD positions. 
Prevailing rates of 
pay 
Allows respective Secretaries to, pursuant to 5 U.S.C §5341, fix rates of pay for individuals in a 
recognized trade or craft according to their prevailing rates under the Federal Wage System.  
Additional 
compensation 
Allows respective Secretaries to provide employees in covered positions with monetary 
benefits, incentives, and allowances that do not exceed amounts for comparable Title 5 
positions. 
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Provision 
DOD Intelligence  
(P.L. 104-201, sec. 1632) 
DHS Cybersecurity 
(P.L. 113-277, sec. 3) 
DOD Cyber Command 
(P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107) 
Probationary 
period 
No similar provisions. Requires a three-year probationary period for covered 
positions. 
Conversion to 
excepted service 
No similar provisions. Employees in competitive service positions that will be 
converted to the excepted service may refuse the 
conversion. 
Implementation 
plan 
No similar provisions. Requires the Secretary to 
submit a plan detailing use of 
the authorities no later than 
120 days after enactment to 
the following committees: 
(1) Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, (2) 
Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, (3) House 
Committee on Homeland 
Security, and (4) the House 
Committee on 
Appropriations. 
Requires the Secretary to 
submit an implementation 
plan for the authority to the 
congressional defense 
committees. The authority 
would go into effect 30 days 
after submission of the plan. 
The plan must include 
information on the plan for 
using the authority, positions 
covered, and anticipated 
workforce needs for the U.S. 
Cyber Command. 
Required 
regulations 
No requirement to promulgate 
regulations. Requires the 
Secretary to submit any 
prescribed regulations to 
Congress 60 days before they 
become effective.  
Requires each Secretary, in coordination with Director of 
OPM, to promulgate regulations to administer the authority. 
Reporting 
requirements 
No similar provisions. Requires the Secretary to, 
every year for four years 
after enactment, submit an 
annual report detailing the 
use of the authority to the 
(1) Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, (2) 
Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, (3) House 
Committee on Homeland 
Security, and (4) the House 
Committee on 
Appropriations. 
Requires the Secretary to, 
every year for five years 
after enactment, submit an 
annual report detailing the 
use of the authority to the 
(1) Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, (2) Senate 
Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government 
Affairs, (3) Senate 
Committee on 
Appropriations, (4) House 
Committee on Armed 
Services, (5) House 
Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform, 
and (6) House Committee 
on Appropriations. 
Source: CRS analysis of the laws cited. 
Notes: The table does not include all provisions included in laws cited. 
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Appendix B. Reporting Requirements  
P.L. 113-277, sec. 3 P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107 
‘‘(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of enactment of this section, and every year 
thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a detailed report 
that— 
‘‘(1) discusses the process used by the Secretary in 
accepting applications, assessing candidates, ensuring 
adherence to veterans’ preference, and selecting 
applicants for vacancies to be filled by an individual for a 
qualified position; 
‘‘(2) describes— 
‘‘(A) how the Secretary plans to fulfill the critical need of 
the Department to recruit and retain employees in 
qualified positions; 
‘‘(B) the measures that will be used to measure progress; 
and 
‘‘(C) any actions taken during the reporting period to 
fulfill such critical need; 
‘‘(3) discusses how the planning and actions taken under 
paragraph (2) are integrated into the strategic workforce 
planning of the Department; 
‘‘(4) provides metrics on actions occurring during the 
reporting period, including— 
‘‘(A) the number of employees in qualified positions hired 
by occupation and grade and level or pay band; 
‘‘(B) the placement of employees in qualified positions by 
directorate and office within the Department; 
‘‘(C) the total number of veterans hired; 
‘‘(D) the number of separations of employees in qualified 
positions by occupation and grade and level or pay band; 
‘‘(E) the number of retirements of employees in qualified 
positions by occupation and grade and level or pay band; 
and 
‘‘(F) the number and amounts of recruitment, relocation, 
and retention incentives paid to employees in qualified 
positions by occupation and grade and level or pay band; 
‘‘(5) describes the training provided to supervisors of 
employees in qualified positions at the Department on 
the use of the new authorities. 
 
‘‘(g) ANNUAL REPORT.—(1) Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this section and not 
less frequently than once each year thereafter until the 
date that is five years after the date of the enactment of 
this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, in coordination with the Secretary, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
detailed report on the administration of this section 
during the most recent one-year period.  
‘‘(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
include, for the period covered by the report, the 
following:  
‘‘(A) A discussion of the process used in accepting 
applications, assessing candidates, ensuring adherence to 
veterans’ preference, and selecting applicants for 
vacancies to be filled by an individual for a qualified 
position.  
‘‘(B) A description of the following:  
‘‘(i) How the Secretary plans to fulfill the critical need of 
the Department to recruit and retain employees in 
qualified positions.  
‘‘(ii) The measures that will be used to measure progress.  
‘‘(iii) Any actions taken during the reporting period to 
fulfill such critical need.  
‘‘(C) A discussion of how the planning and actions taken 
under subparagraph (B) are integrated into the strategic 
workforce planning of the Department.  
‘‘(D) The metrics on actions occurring during the 
reporting period, including the following:  
‘‘(i) The number of employees in qualified positions 
hired, disaggregated by occupation, grade, and level or 
pay band.  
‘‘(ii) The placement of employees in qualified positions, 
disaggregated by military department, Defense Agency, 
or other component within the Department.  
‘‘(iii) The total number of veterans hired.  
‘‘(iv) The number of separations of employees in qualified 
positions, disaggregated by occupation and grade and 
level or pay band.  
‘‘(v) The number of retirements of employees in qualified 
positions, disaggregated by occupation, grade, and level 
or pay band.  
‘‘(vi) The number and amounts of recruitment, 
relocation, and retention incentives paid to employees in 
qualified positions, disaggregated by occupation, grade, 
and level or pay band.  
‘‘(E) A description of the training provided to supervisors 
of employees in qualified positions at the Department on 
the use of the new authorities. 
Source: P.L. 113-277 and P.L. 114-92. 
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